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Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest:
A New Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant
Ben E. Stewart
INTRODUCTION
T HE value of communication has been recognized since early in recordedhistory.! Recorded history itself is denoted by the development of
enduring communication systems, such as writing, that relax the boundaries
of time.' Importantly, humans employ various methods of communication
and often utilize those methods simultaneously. For example, an assistant
might write a note to an attorney concerning information conveyed to the
assistant by a client. The assistant writes the message as the client speaks
to her. In this way, both written and oral communications are performed
simultaneously. Communication, in almost every form, is extremely
important to individual and societal development. It is, therefore,
unsurprising that technological advances facilitating communication are
often heralded as defining moments in history.'
As has been true of other technological advances in communication,
cell phones and the constantly expanding range of possible methods of
communications associated with these devices have had significant effects
on individuals and society. Cell phones, especially the latest generations
of cell phones, have made the communication advances of computers
more mobile. Cell phones can send text messages; they can take pictures
and record video; and, of course, they can transmit a speaker's voice.' The
capability of some phones, like the iPhone, to access the Internet multiplies
the value of cell phones in communication. The widespread use of cell
I JD, expected May 201I, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA in Government,
magna cum laude, May 2008, Centre College.
2 See, e.g., Genesis I 1: 1 -9.
3 Communication, COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008), available at http://www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/communication.aspx ("The reduction of communication to writing was a funda-
mental step in the evolution of society for, in addition to being useful in situations where
speech is not possible, writing permits the preservation of communications, or records, from
the past.").
4 See, e.g., NSF and the Birth of the Internet: 196os, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, http://
www.nsf.gov/news/special-reports/nsf-net/textonly/6os.jsp (last updated Mar. 23, 2009).
5 M. Wesley Clark, Searching Cell Phones Seized Incident to Arrest, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Feb. 2oo9, at 25, 29 (citation omitted), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/law-enforcement-bulliten/2o9-pdfs/februaryo9leb.pdf.
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phones demonstrates the value individuals, businesses, and governments
place on them.' At the same time, cell phones present challenges to the
law. One characteristic of cell phones is the capacity to store vast amounts
of information, creating a durable record of communication between
individuals. These records (text messages, incoming/outgoing call logs,
contact lists, pictures, videos, and so forth) often contain private, personal,
and sometimes confidential information.
Like advances in communication technology, the law adapts to meet
the needs and desires of society. Long ago, American law developed to
protect the privacy of individuals. This development is embodied in
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
protects against unjustified searches and seizures.' The effect of the Fourth
Amendment on searches of cell phones, however, is somewhat uncertain
because of cell phone technology's recent development. As is often the
case when considering the law's effect on a new object or idea, the question
is whether cell phone searches should be treated as analogous to a well-
developed area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or as something new
and different.
The Fourth Amendment only allows searches premised upon search
warrants, notwithstanding some exceptions the Supreme Court has
identified. A search of the person of an arrestee incident to his or her lawful
arrest has long been recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.' A warrantless search that does not fall within
an exception to the warrant requirement is subject to suppression under
the Exclusionary Rule.' Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Exclusionary Rule applies to the states by virtue of incorporation of the
Fourth Amendment. 0 In 2009, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court
limited the search incident to arrest exception by only allowing searches
related to the reason for the initial arrest."
While the Supreme Court's holding in Gant concerned searches
incident to arrest in the vehicle context, a substantially similar standard to
the one announced in Gant should be applied to cell phones. Cell phones,
unsurprisingly carried on a person, should not be allowed to be searched
incident to arrest without a warrant apart from circumstances unique to
the particular arrest. These unique circumstances would be those in which
6 See Press Release, Census Bureau, Text-Messenging Soars (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cbo9-i9o.html ("In 2008,
there were more than 270 million cell phone subscribers; they paid an average monthly bill of
$5o with the average call lasting 2 minutes, 16 seconds.").
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV
8 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
9 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914).
io Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961).
ii Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723-24 (2009).
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there is reason to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest may be
found in the cell phone. This standard is superior because it balances the
liberty interests of individuals with the societal interests of effective law
enforcement.
This Note is divided into five parts that aggregate to justify the
aforementioned conclusion. Part I briefly outlines the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to searches incident to arrest
leading up to Gant, especially in relation to vehicle searches incident to
arrest. Importantly, Part I enumerates the justifications for the exceptions
to the warrant requirement as delineated by the Court. Part II discusses
how Gant has changed the landscape of the search incident to arrest
exception, especially in the vehicle context. Part III analyzes lower court
opinions relating to the admission of evidence found in cell phones. These
decisions were influenced by, and some directly rely upon, the holding
in New York v. Belton, a decision that is limited in scope by Gant. Part IV
critically examines the reasoning behind lower court opinions admitting
evidence obtained as a result of searching a cell phone incident to arrest.
Specifically, Part IV analyzes the classification of a cell phone as a container,
the degree to which a preservation of evidence exigency is persuasive, and
the benefits to law enforcement of searching cell phones incident to arrest.
Part V offers a standard for searches of cell phones incident to arrest based
on Gant. This standard best balances the needs of law enforcement and the
liberty interests of individuals protected by the Fourth Amendment."
I. BACKGROUND ON THE SEARCH INCIDENT To ARREST EXCEPTION
The search incident to arrest exception is a justification often cited by
the government in criminal prosecutions in order to introduce evidence
obtained without a search warrant. In United States v. Robinson, the Court
held that an officer may search the person of an arrestee incident to a
custodial arrest." The defendant in Robinson was stopped and arrested for
driving on a revoked operator's permit.1 The arresting officer had checked
the defendant's license status four days earlier and knew that his operator's
permit had been revoked, and the defendant conceded for the purposes
of appeal that the officer had probable cause to arrest." After arresting the
defendant, the officer began to pat him down. 6 Upon feeling an object, the
12 The importance of this question from the perspective of criminal law practice and for
law enforcement has not gone unnoticed. See generally Justin M. Wolcott, Note, Are Smart-
phones Like Foodockers or Crumpled Cigarette Packages? Applying The Search Incident To Arrest Doc-
trine To Smariphones In South Carolina Courts, 61 S.C. L. REV. 843 (2010).
13 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
14 Id. at 220.
15 Id. at 220-21.
16 Id. at 222-23.
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officer reached into the arrestee's coat and retrieved a crumpled cigarette
package containing fourteen heroin capsules." The Court distinguished a
Terry18 search from a search incident to arrest by examining the underlying
justifications for each exception: "[t]he justification or reason for the
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does
on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial."19
No particularized suspicion is required in order to search the person of an
arrestee incident to a lawful arrest. 0 The Court also noted that a search
incident to arrest is not limited to the person of the arrestee, but includes
the area immediately around the arrestee as well."
In Chimelv. California, the Court, to some degree, clarified the boundaries
of this area." Chimel involved the search of an entire home purportedly
conducted pursuant to a search incident to arrest. Upon arriving at the
defendant's home, officers arrested the defendant pursuant to an arrest
warrant.24 Prior to the defendant's arrest, his wife let the officers into the
home. After arresting the defendant, the officers searched through drawers,
closets, and other closed spaces for evidence of a coin shop burglary.
The ChimelCourt defined the "area within his immediate control" in light
of the underlying justifications for a search incident to arrest. 6 The area
within the arrestee's immediate control is "the area from within which [the
arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence";,
searching an entire home, without an exigency, is not within the scope of a
permissible search." In this decision, the Court tethered the limits of the
exception to the purposes of the exception.
While one can easily distinguish between rooms in a home, the
decision as to whether the contents and containers of a vehicle are within
17 Id. at 223.
18 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i (1968).
19 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
20 Id. at 235 ("The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evi-
dence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.").
21 Id. at 224 ("The second is that a search may be made of the area within the control
of the arrestee.").
22 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
23 Id. at 753-54.
24 Id at 753.
25 Id. at 753-54-
26 Id. at 762-63.
27 Id. at 763.
28 Id.
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the arrestee's immediate control is a more difficult determination. Vehicle
searches incident to arrest are relevant to the analysis of cell phone
searches incident to arrest: phones, like vehicles, are both mobile and
highly regulated. Most importantly, in deciding cell phone suppression
issues, lower courts have used reasoning similar to, and cited cases directly
addressing, vehicle searches incident to arrest. 29
New York v. Beltonso and Thornton v. United States3' were vehicle search
incident to arrest cases; these cases were limited in Arizona v. Gant.3 1 In
New York v. Belton, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and, upon
questioning, discovered that none of the four occupants owned or were
related to the owner of the vehicle." Smelling marijuana and noticing an
envelope labeled "Supergold"34 in the vehicle, the officer frisked all four
occupants, looked in the envelope, and discovered marijuana.35 The officer
also retrieved a jacket from the passenger compartment of the vehicle,
unzipped a pocket, and discovered cocaine.3 6 The Court held that the scope
of a search incident to a lawful arrest included the passenger compartment
of an automobile in which the arrestee was riding.37
In Thornton v. United States, the Court considered whether a vehicle
recently occupied by an arrestee was within the scope of the rule in
Belton.38 A police officer became suspicious of a vehicle whose driver
did not seem to want to drive beside him. 39 The officer ran the tags and
discovered that they did not match the make or model of the vehicle.40 By
that time, the defendant had parked the vehicle and was walking away."
The officer stopped him, patted him down, and after feeling a bulge, asked
the defendant if he had any narcotics.42 The defendant removed marijuana
and crack cocaine from his pockets.4 3 The officer placed the defendant in
the police cruiser after handcuffing him and informing him that he was
under arrest."
29 See infra Part II.
30 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,46o (1981).
31 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004).
32 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 17 1o passim (2009).
33 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-
34 The officer associated "Supergold" with marijuana. Id. at 456.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 455-56.
37 Id. at 462-63.
38 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 618.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id
44 Id.
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The Court applied the bright-line rule announced in Belton-namely,
that an officer may search the entire passenger compartment once there
is probable cause to arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle.45 The Court
declined to make a distinction based on whether the occupant exited the
vehicle on his or her own initiative or by police order.' The Court held
that "[s]o long as an arrestee is the sort of 'recent occupant' of a vehicle
such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the
arrest." 47
II. ARIZONA v. GANT CHANGES THE LANDSCAPE OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO
ARREST EXCEPTION
A mere four years after the Court established the bright line rule in
Thornton v. United States, it blurred that line in Arizona v. Gant.4" In the
majority opinion, Justice Stevens devoted considerable energy to relating
and distinguishing the Gant decision from both Belton and Thornton. 9 In
fact, the majority opinion casts the decisions in Belton and Thornton as based
on fundamentally different fact patterns than the fact pattern in Gant.s0
In Gant, the police acted on an anonymous tip that a residence was
being used to sell drugs by knocking on the door of the residence and
asking to see the owner." Rodney Gant opened the door and told officers
the owner would return later.52 The police left but conducted a records
search that revealed that Gant had an outstanding warrant for driving
on a suspended license." The police returned later, arresting a man for
providing a false name and a woman for possession of drug paraphernalia.5 4
Gant pulled in the driveway while the police were at the residence, and
he was arrested after exiting his vehicle.5 Once Gant was handcuffed and
secured in a police cruiser, police searched the car he had been driving and
discovered cocaine and a firearm."
45 Id. at 623.
46 Id. at 621-22; see also id. at 615-16 ("[W]hile an arrestee's status as a 'recent occupant'
may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search,
it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment when the
officer first initiated contact with him.").
47 Id. at 623-24.
48 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
49 See id. at 1722.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 1714.
52 Id. at 1714-15.
53 Id. at 1715.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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The majority in Gant emphatically distinguished these facts from the
facts in Belton and Thornton. First, the Court viewed the ratio of officers to
arrestees as an important factor in determining the reasonableness of the
search.5 1 Second, the Court viewed the nature of the suspected crime as
salient; that is to say, the Court considered whether the alleged crime was
one that might produce physical evidence that could be discovered in a
vehicle as an important issue." Third, the Court saw the degree to which
the arrestees were secured and the situation was stabilized as an important
consideration. 9 The focus of this third consideration was whether the
arrestee was "unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search" such that it would be possible
to access a weapon or destructible evidence.so The Court described the
relationship between the facts of Belton and Gant as a non-relationship in
that "it is hard to imagine two cases that are factually more distinct."6 1
Notwithstanding the Court's accentuation of factual distinctions from
prior decisions, Gant changed the landscape of the search incident to
arrest exception. The holding of Belton had been broadly interpreted, and
police had heavily relied upon this interpretation. 61 In Thornton, Justice
O'Connor noted in concurrence that the Court's decision in Belton had
resulted in a broad interpretation of police power by police departments
and lower courts.63 Those two entities, it seems, failed to recognize the
implicit assumption upon which the decision in Belton was based; namely,
containers and articles in a vehicle's passenger compartment are almost
inevitably within the reach of a recent occupant at the time of the search.'
Gant recognized that this assumption was, in fact, more often incorrect than
correct.65
57 See id. at 1716-17 ("A lone police officer [in Belton] stopped a speeding car in which
Belton was one of four occupants."); see also id. at 1719 ("Unlike in Belton,... the five officers
in this case outnumbered the three arrestees .... ").
58 Id. at 1719 ("An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas
Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for ... an offense for
which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant's car.").
59 Id.
6o Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 1722.
62 Id. at 1718 ("[O]ur opinion [in Belton] has been widely understood to allow a vehicle
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee
could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.").
63 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2oo4) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
(citation omitted).
64 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 46o (1981)).
65 Id. at 1723 ("We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely
'within "the area into which an arrestee might reach"' . (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 46o)).
201O-20II1 585
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The Court's decision in Gant demonstrates a reaffirmation of and
adherence to the rationales announced in Chimel."6 Chimel defines the
boundaries for the search incident to arrest exception; the rationales of
the exception-officer safety and preservation of destructible evidence-
demarcate the limits of the exception.6 1 If neither interest is implicated in
the facts of an arrest, the warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is
unreasonable.u
In reaffirming Chimel, the Court specified two situations when a search
is reasonable. First, the Court held that "[plolice may search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search . . . ."69
Second, the Court adopted a standard proposed by Justice Scalia in his
concurrence in Thornton related to the destruction of evidence rationale. 70
In Thornton, Justice Scalia argued for limiting Belton searches of vehicles to
those in which "it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle."7 This basis creates a quasi-bright-
line rule for law enforcement: no determination as to whether an arrestee
is within reaching distance is required if there is reason to believe that
evidence of the offense of arrest is in the vehicle.7n
III. CELL PHONE ADMISSIBILITY DECISIONS HAVE RELIED ON NEW YORK V.
BELTON
The Supreme Court has addressed Fourth Amendment issues raised
with landline telephones,7 3 but the Court has yet to address cell phones
directly.7 4 Lower courts have used various forms of reasoning to decide
Fourth Amendment cell phone search challenges. Many courts have
pointed to the preservation of evidence rationale from Chimel because of
the finite memory and destructibility of information.7 1 Other courts have
likened the phone to a container." Notably, courts deciding cases in which
cell phones were searched incident to arrest have relied on New York v.
66 Seeid. at 1719.
67 Id. at 1716.
68 Id. at 1716, 1723-24.
69 Id. at 1723.
70 See id. at 1719.
71 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
72 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
73 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347-48 (1967).
74 United States v. Finley, 477 F3d 250, 258-6o (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353
(2007); State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 166, 2oo9-Ohio-6426, 92o N.E.2d 949,952 at 1 14,
cert. denied, 131 Cr. 102 (2010).
75 See infra Part I.B.
76 See infra Part W.A.i.
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Belton.7 As discussed supra, Arizona v. Gant seemingly calls the validity of
cases relying on Belton into question."
In United States v. Sam Tong Chan, a California federal district court faced
a Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission of information obtained
from a warrantless search of the defendant's pager.79 An undercover Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent had a person named Ma (later a
codefendant in the case) page Chan and request that he deliver heroin to
the DEA.so Ma used a hotel telephone to request the delivery." Chan was
arrested after delivery, and a DEA agent seized his pager." After "activating
its memory and retrieving certain telephone numbers that were stored in
the pager," the DEA agent discovered that it contained the number from the
hotel telephone.* The court ruled that there was a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the contents of the pager but determined this expectation
of privacy was "destroyed as the result of a valid search incident to an
arrest."" Interestingly, Chan did not challenge the seizure of the pager
because it was on his person. Instead, he challenged the warrantless search
of the contents after the seizure." Chan argued that a warrant is required to
search a closed container once the container is reduced to police control.
Relying on Belton, which permits warrantless searches of containers in the
immediate control of the arrestee, the court ruled that a container may be
searched when the search is incident to an arrest."
Another case arising out of the pager era is United States v. Ortiz." The
facts of Ortiz are strikingly similar to the facts in Chan. A heroin dealer
named Hurtado agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after selling
heroin to an undercover agent. 9 Hurtado provided the pager number of
a man he identified as "Julio" to the DEA." Hurtado then spoke on the
phone to the defendant, Julio Ortiz, and the two agreed to consummate
77 See, e.g., United States v. Sam Tong Chan, 83o F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
78 See infra Part V.
79 Sam Tong Chan, 830 E Supp. at 533.
8o Id. at 532-33.
81 Id. at 533.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 536.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 535.
87 Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981) ("'Container' here denotes
any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compart-
ments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as
well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.")).
88 United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996).
89 Id. at 982.
9o Id.
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a heroin transaction at a nearby McDonald's restaurant.9' When Hurtado
identified Julio, officers arrested Julio and seized his pager; Hurtado's
call was discovered after a search of the pager's contents.92 The Seventh
Circuit cited the reasoning in Chan with approval, noting that searching
the contents of a pager immediately after arrest was not so remote in
time or place as to be outside the search incident to arrest exception.93 By
citing Chan, the court in Ortiz relied on Belton and the broad meaning of
"container" defined therein.
In both Chan and Ortiz, the pagers were used to set up the purchase
of controlled substances. By contrast, United States v. Finley involved
a cell phone, and the device was not used in setting up the purchase.
Furthermore, the defendant's cell phone was searched for text messages
rather than numbers linking him to some previous call initiated by police.'
Finley drove a passenger named Brown to a truck stop in order for
Brown to engage in a methamphetamine transaction that, unbeknownst
to Brown or Finley, had been set up by the DEA.9" Officers stopped the
vehicle in which Finley and Brown were traveling.98 The van was searched,
and both individuals were arrested and transported to Brown's residence,
which was being searched pursuant to a search warrant." Finley's cell
phone was seized from his person at the time of arrest. 10 While at Brown's
residence, a federal agent searched the text messages of Finley's phone.10'
The court relied on the search incident to arrest exception in deciding that
the text messages did not have to be suppressed. 0 z The Fifth Circuit cited
Belton and Ortiz in ruling that the search was reasonable.'o As the phone
was not used in establishing the illegal transaction, Finley demonstrates the
broad scope afforded the search of containers, including cell phones, under
Belton.
9 i Id.
92 Id. at 982-83.
93 Id. at 984.
94 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,46o n.4 (1981).
95 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 253.
98 Id. at 254.
99 Id.
ioo Id.
ioi Id.
1o2 Id. at 259-60.
io3 Id. at 260.
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IV. THE POST-GANT LANDSCAPE
A. The "Container" Question
1. Classification of Cell Phones as Containers.-Perhaps one reason courts
have been willing to view cell phone searches under the vehicle search
incident to arrest analysis is the fact that there seems to be little hesitation
in classifying a cell phone as a "container." Apart from cell phones, the
Supreme Court has addressed issues arising from warrantless searches of
closed containers on numerous occasions.
Criminal defendants have made the argument that the rule announced
in United States v. Chadwick'os should control.'" Chadwick involved a locked
footlocker transported by train. When the travelers toting the footlocker
arrived at their destination, police arrested them immediately after they
loaded the footlocker in the trunk of a car. 0 Federal agents took the
defendants and the footlocker to a secure federal building where the
footlocker was opened, without a warrant, and marijuana was discovered.'
The rule from Chadwick is that in the context of a search incident to arrest,
if "no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search,
the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be
searched comes under the exclusive dominion of the police authority."'"
The Court made a distinction between "searches of possessions within
an arrestee's control" and "searches of the person"; Chadwick controls the
latter but not the former."0
The Supreme Court revisited Chadwick, along with other precedent,
in California v. Acevedo."' Chadwick caused some confusion among law
enforcement and lower courts concerning containers found in vehicles,
especially outside the passenger compartment. The Court established
the rule that "police may search an automobile and the containers within
it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained.""' In essence, the basis for the probable cause determines the
scope of the search."' However, Acevedo addressed the scope of container
104 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 8oo (1982).
io5 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
io6 See, e.g., United States v. Sam Tong Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
107 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4.
lo8 Id. at 4-5.
109 Id. at 15.
io Id. at 16 n.io (citations omitted).
iii California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 571 (199)
112 Id. at 58o.
113 Id. at 579-8o ("'The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is not defined
by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it is defined by
20IO-20II 589
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searches under the vehicle exception, not the search incident to arrest
exception.'14
Chadwick and Acevedo indicate that some rather fine distinctions come
into play if a cell phone is characterized as a container in the same sense
that a footlocker, suitcase, or an opaque bag is a container. One such
distinction is whether the phone was on the person of the arrestee, in the
area of the arrestee's immediate control but reduced to exclusive police
control, or merely in the vehicle that the arrestee recently occupied.
Under Chadwick, if the phone was on the person of the arrestee, then no
suspicion is required; the container may be searched without concern for
officer safety or evidentiary considerations." Also under Chadwick, if the
phone was in the arrestee's immediate control, then the police could seize
the phone but could not examine the contents in the absence of a safety
or preservation of evidence exigency."' Alternatively, under Acevedo, if
the phone was discovered in the trunk of a vehicle, outside the arrestee's
immediate control, then the police must have probable cause to search the
contents." 7
This distinction is discussed in the unreported case, United States
v. Park."' In Park, the defendant was detained when he visited a home
being monitored by police immediately preceding the execution of a
search warrant."9 Upon executing the warrant, police discovered an indoor
marijuana cultivation operation; all those detained were then arrested. 20
The arrestees' cell phones were not seized at the time of arrest, but the
defendant's phone was searched at the stationhouse during booking, over
ninety minutes after his arrest.'2' The court elucidated the holding of
Chadwick by making a distinction between items closely associated with
the person of the arrestee and possessions in the immediate control of the
arrestee. 22
The court in Park concluded that a cell phone should be characterized as
a "possession[] within [the] arrestee's immediate control.""3 The particular
facts of Park make this an easier classification than the facts in many other
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may
be found."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982))).
H 4 See id. at 579-80.
115 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14-15 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
i16 See id. at 15.
117 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 58o.
1I8 United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007).
i19 Id.at* 1-2.
120 Id. at *2.
121 Id. at *2-5.
122 Id. at *6.
123 Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 16 n.io (1977)).
[Vol. 99590
CELL PHONE SEARCHES
cell phone search cases. First, the defendant was not in a vehicle at the
time he was arrested.'24 Second, the defendant's phone was not seized at
the time of his arrest."2 s There was significant delay between arrest and
seizure and the subsequent search; the search was after booking, in the
stationhouse.z 6 The fact that the search was in the stationhouse tends to
make it seem more like an inventory search.' Thus, there are significant
factual differences between Park and other cell phone search cases. But,
the court in Park did not base its ruling upon the factual differences, stating
that the facts only "differ slightly."' Rather, the court determined that cell
phones are possessions within the arrestee's immediate control "because
modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of
private information."' 9 Accordingly, the court applied the rule in Chadwick
that a warrant is required for containers that are possessions within an
arrestee's immediate control when there is no exigency.'
2. Cell Phones Are Not Containers For Purposes of the Fourth Amendment.-A
cell phone is not a "container" according to the term's common usage,"'
but more importantly, a cell phone should not be a "container" for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Three lines of reasoning support this
conclusion. First, Belton's definition of "container" would not include cell
phones. Second, cell phones do not contain mysterious contents, the nature
of which police cannot determine. Third, cases classifying cell phones as
containers have incorrectly relied on United States v. Finley in support of the
decisions.
While Be/ton defined "container" broadly, that definition does not
include the contents of cell phones. Belton defined "container" as an
"object capable of holding another object." 3 2 Containers are typically those
objects that by their nature hold some other object in such a way that the
contained object can be removed from the containing object and used. 3 3
124 Id. at *2.
125 Id.
126 Id. at *2-3.
127 Id. at*IO-I2.
128 Id. at *8 (referring to a discussion of the factual context of United States v. Finley, 477
E3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2007) and Park).
129 Id.
130 Id. at *9.
131 con-tain-er
: one that contains: as
a: a receptacle (as a box or jar) for holding goods
b: a portable compartment in which freight is placed (as on a train or ship) for
convenience of movement.
MERRIAMI-NVEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DiCrIONARY 269 (i ith ed. 2003).
132 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,461 n.4 (1981).
133 See State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2oo9-Ohio-6426, 92o N.E.2d 949, at I 19
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The nature of the contained object is most often undeterminable without
searching. It is unlikely that either arrestees or law enforcement agencies
are interested in any physical "object" contained within a cell phone.
Rather, the information, which is not an object, most acutely concerns law
enforcement.
A cell phone also does not seem logically analogous to other "containers"
because police know what cell phones "contain"-information. When
opening a crumpled cigarette package, as in RobinsonM or a brown bag, as
in Acevedo,' the officer does not know the nature of the substance within.
The officer is unsure whether the object is intrinsically dangerous, if the
contents will enable the arrestee to hurt himself or others, or if the contents
of the container are an appropriate possession for an individual soon to be
detained in a local jail. The Court was willing to permit searches incident
to arrest in Robinson, even when not tied to any particularized suspicion,
because of uncertainty concerning the nature of the object or substance in
a container. 3 6 The nature of a cell phone is fundamentally different from
the "containers" contemplated and discussed by the Court in previous
Fourth Amendment cases. Police already know the nature of a cell phone's
contents-digital photos, phone numbers, and other intangible personal
data.
Furthermore, several cases have relied on unsupportive precedent
in likening a cell phone to a container. Many cases involving cell phone
searches that have classified cell phones as containers have relied, at least
in part, on United States v. Finley.'3 1 In Finley, the Fifth Circuit treated the
phone searched as a container."' But notably, the court in Finley did not
engage in any analysis or expound upon the reasoning for classifying a
cell phone as a container. The explanation for this classification is that the
defendant in Finley conceded that the phone was a container.'39 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit did not consider the alternative argument that a cell
phone is not a container. The United States Supreme Court declined to
review the case.'o
It is a practical reality that cell phone ownership is the rule rather than
the exception in society.141 The widespread use of cell phones underscores
(holding that a cell phone is not a container based on the definition in Belton).
134 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
135 California v. Acevedo, 5oo U.S. 565, 567 (199).
136 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 n.5 ("The danger to the police officer flows from the
fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds
for arrest.").
137 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5 th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353 (2oo7).
138 Finley, 477 F.3d at 26o.
139 Id.
14o Finley v. United States, 549 U.S. 1353 (2007) (denying writ of certiorari).
141 See Press Release, supra note 6.
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the importance of classifying cell phones correctly under the Fourth
Amendment in order to balance individuals' privacy interests with the
practical needs of effective law enforcement. A cell phone is not a container
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and should not be classified as
such.
B. The Preservation of Evidence Exigency Due to Finite Memory is No Longer
Persuasive
While no particularized suspicion is required for a search incident to
arrest, there must be, at a minimum, the possibility of destruction of evidence
or a threat to an officer's safety.'42 Gant re-affirmed this requirement.143
Because the threat to officer safety is minimal in the cell phone context,
destruction of evidence caused by the finite memory capacity of electronic
devices is the justification courts have utilized for permitting searches.14
The finite memory exigency is the idea that as phone calls or messages
are received, older phone calls and messages will be automatically
deleted.'45 The functional rationale for a device deleting the oldest
information is that there is simply insufficient memory to retain all data,
and new data is given priority. If courts used this factual assumption about
the functional characteristics of particular electronic devices, this was
likely a more reasonable assumption when the finite memory exigency
was first articulated. However, technological developments have made this
assumption less reasonable, especially for more technologically advanced
devices.'4
The first cases involving portable electronic devices often involved
pagers with finite memories.147 Today, cell phones can store vast amounts
of information. In fact, many phones are more analogous to computers in
terms of the amount of personal data they can store. Courts even recognize
that "the line between cell phones and personal computers has grown
increasingly blurry."'" Given that cell phone memory, while not infinite, is
142 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
143 See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Young, 278 E App'x 242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2oo8); United States v. Ortiz, 84 E3d 977, 984 (7th
Cir. 1996).
145 E.g., Oriz, 84 F.3d at 984 ("Because of the finite nature of a pager's electronic memo-
ry, incoming pages may destroy currently stored telephone numbers in a pager's memory. The
contents of some pagers also can be destroyed merely by turning off the power or touching a
button." (citation omitted)).
146 See, e.g., Jacob Leibenluft, Do Text Messages Live Forever?, SLATE (May 1, 2008, 6:51
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2I 90382.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Meriwether, 917 E2d 955,957 (6th Cir. i99o).
148 United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at '8 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007).
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certainly less limited than the capacities of the pagers of yore, a preservation
of evidence rationale may be inappropriate.
As cell phones' capabilities increase, so do memory capacities and the
tendency of individuals to use these capacities to store personal, often
private, information. Newer phones, like the iPhone, can show "incoming
and outgoing call histories, scan contact lists, read thousands of emails,
view nearly limitless numbers of color photographs and movies, listen
to voicemail at the touch of the button, and view the Internet websites
. . . visited."1 4 9 A few courts have begun to acknowledge the growing
capabilities of cell phones and the fact that they are a repository of personal
information.s 0
If the destruction of evidence exigency truly is a concern, there are
alternatives that protect the rights of individuals while preserving evidence.
While the phone is in the arrestee's possession, the information can be
deleted or the phone itself destroyed. Once seized, the phone is beyond
the arrestee's control and can simply be turned off."' Officers could then
obtain a search warrant and power up the phone, thereby preserving both
the arrestee's Fourth Amendment privacy interests and eliminating the
possible destruction of evidence.
C. Cell Phone Searches Aid Law Enforcement
Notwithstanding that cell phones are not "containers" and the
destruction of evidence exigency has become less tenable, evidence
obtained from cell phones is valuable to law enforcement. Obviously,
criminals can use cell phones to further their illicit motives." 2 In these
instances, cell phones provide both the means to a criminal's ends and a
potential source of the criminal's undoing. The text messaging function of
149 Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27,
44(2oo8).
150 Park, 200 7 WL 1521573, at *8 ("Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones
record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and
text messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on
their cell phones, and can record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell
phones through email and text, voice and instant messages." (internal citation omitted)); State
v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 169, 2oo9-Ohio-6426, 92o N.E.2d 949, 955 at (123 ("Although
cell phones cannot be equated with laptop computers, their ability to store large amounts of
private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of pri-
vacy in the information they contain.").
151 See Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d at 169, 2oo9-Ohio-6426,92o N.E.2d at 955 at9 23 ("Once
the cell phone is in police custody, the state has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting
and preserving evidence and can take preventive steps to ensure that the data found on the
phone are neither lost nor erased.").
152 See, e.g., United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 637 (ioth Cir. 1992) ("The search of his
vehicle produced a large amount of cash, a semiautomatic pistol, and a cellular phone, each of
which is a recognized tool of the trade in drug dealing." (citation omitted)).
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cell phones may be especially useful to law enforcement. In addition to
serving as a convenient substitute for the more ephemeral spoken word, a
text message provides a lasting record of the substance of a communication.
One commentator, though not emphasizing the possible beneficial use of
cell phone evidence, noted the value of information held in cell phones:
"the iPhone stores tremendously more information-thereby providing
law enforcement with access to information that the typical arrestee would
otherwise be incapable of carrying in his pocket.""s3
The widespread use also means that police officers will often be faced
with situations in which they will have to make decisions whether or not
to search.' Police departments are aware of the potential value of cell
phones as rich deposits of evidence. By example, several law enforcement
publications address and frequently update information related to the
lawful search of cell phones without a warrant.ss
The cell phone as a repository of evidence of criminal activity is amplified
by the multifarious functions cell phones are capable of performing.,5 "
Again, the fact that one device can store such a vast array of different
types and formats of personal information is persuasive justification for the
protection of individuals' privacy in cell phones. But the sword is double-
edged because the very fact that so many functions can be performed by
one device means that evidence is likely to be concentrated in one place,
rather than discoverable in several places on the person and in the area
within the arrestee's immediate control."s'
Because of the potential benefits of cell phone evidence to law
enforcement, circumstances unique to particular situations may justify
a phone search incident to arrest. The Court in Gant acknowledged
similar reasoning when referring to "circumstances unique to the vehicle
context.""5 s In some respects, a cell phone is like a vehicle, and there are
circumstances in which a warrant should not be required, just as there are
"circumstances unique to the vehicle context."' United States v. McCray
provides a useful example.'6
153 Gershowitz, supra note 149, at 41.
154 Carl Milazzo, Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: 2009 Update, MIE POLICE CHIEF,
May 2oo9, available at http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print
display&article-id=1789&issue-id=52009 (stating that cell phones "are so prevalent that it is
rare to make an arrest today without encountering this form of evidence").
155 See generally Clark, supra note 5, at 25; Milazzo, supra note 154.
156 See Clark, supra note 5, at 26 ("[Olficers are likely to discover only one device, the
cell phone, performing multiple functions, such as phone capability, texting, e-mailing, and
Internet browsing.").
157 See id. ("Recent technological developments have led to the consolidation of per-
sonal communication devices into one.").
158 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 17 10, 1719 (2009).
159 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
I6o United States v. McCray, No. CR4o8-231, 2009 WL 29607 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009).
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In McCray, when officers responded to a report of sexual activity, they
observed a fourteen-year-old girl remaining in the defendant's vehicle after
the defendant had exited. 6 1 She told officers that she had been "playing
with [the defendant's] thing" in exchange for money and food.'16 During
a consensual search of the vehicle, officers saw crack-cocaine, and during a
post-arrest inventory search of the vehicle, officers discovered an obscene
Polaroid photograph of a female." The police officers then searched the
defendant's phone for evidence of a sex crime with the minor by briefly
viewing the phone's stored images."M After discovering obscene images
of the minor stored on the phone, officers obtained a warrant for a more
comprehensive search of the phone.' 6s
Given the nature of the situation and surrounding circumstances, it
was not unreasonable to believe that the cell phone contained evidence
of a crime. Based on the fact that police had already observed an obscene
photograph, coupled with the report of sexual activity to which the officers
were responding and the statements by the alleged victim, one could argue
that the officers had reason to believe the phone might contain evidence of
sexual acts with a minor.'"
Cell phones contain private information in various forms. Cell phones
may also house digital evidence of criminal activity. Unfortunately, it is very
difficult to limit the benefits of technological advancements to only those
who use technology for law-abiding purposes. In consideration of situations
like McCray, and given that cell phones hold such great evidentiary
potential, their usefulness to law enforcement is a practical reality that
cannot be ignored in crafting a standard for cell phone searches.
V. A STANDARD FOR CELL PHONE SEARCHES INCIDENT To ARREST BASED ON
ARIZONA v. GANT
Gant was an acknowledgment of practical reality. The Court recognized
that objects in the passenger compartment of a vehicle are not "inevitably[]
within the area into which an arrestee might reach."' 6 1 With the recognition
of this fact, the Court tied the search incident to arrest exception to the
underpinning justifications of preservation of evidence and officer safety. 6
But Gant also created an exception for searching a vehicle incident to the
I6I Id. at * i.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *1-2.
164 Id. at *2.
t65 Id. at *4.
I66 Id. at *2.
167 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (20o9) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454,460 (198i)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Setid. at 1716.
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arrest of a recent occupant if there is reason to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the crime of arrest.'"9 The Court grounded this addition to the
search incident to arrest doctrine on the fact that there are "circumstances
unique to the vehicle context.""o
There are also unique circumstances for courts and law enforcement
to consider in the cell phone search context. First, a cell phone is not a
container in the same sense that an opaque bag, a crumpled cigarette
package, or even luggage is a container. Cell phones do not hold or hide
objects the nature of which is unknown to law enforcement; cell phones
hold data. Second, some cell phones have developed to a point-and
continue to rapidly develop-where an argument for the preservation
of evidence exigency based on finite memory is less convincing. Third,
cell phones are capable of performing various functions, as well as storing
tremendous amounts of personal information; protecting people's privacy
in their phones is a weighty concern. Finally, cell phones can be used to
carry on illicit activities and frustrate the enforcement of the law. The
technology that connects us to one another can be used for antisocial
purposes. Given that prior decisions dealing with the issue of warrantless
searches of cell phones have relied on Belton,"' perhaps this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence should be re-examined in light of Gant.
At least one court presciently noted the importance of cell phone search
issues and the potential for guidance from the Supreme Court in Gant. In
United States v. Quintana, a police officer stopped a motorist traveling ninety
miles per hour on a stretch of highway with a posted speed limit of seventy
miles per hour."' After detecting the "odor of raw marijuana," the officer
radioed for backup.7 3 The driver denied having marijuana and consented
to a search of the vehicle.'74 A particular duffel bag had an especially strong
odor of marijuana, but the police found none."' The defendant explained,
when asked, that he occasionally smoked marijuana.7 6 The officer arrested
the defendant after learning, via radio, that the defendant's license had
been suspended for failure to pay a traffic fine."' While in custody, the
defendant's cell phone rang repeatedly; without seeking the defendant's
permission, an officer removed the phone from the defendant's pocket and
called the last incoming number."' After speaking on the phone, the officer
169 See id. at 1719.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Sam Tong Chan, 830 F SupP. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
I72 United States v. Quintana, 594 E Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2oo9).
173 Id. at I295.
174 Id.
i75 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
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began to look through its contents, especially the photographs, in hopes of
finding an explanation for the marijuana odor.' 9 The photographs depicted
what the officers believed to be a "'grow house.""o This led officers to the
address on the defendant's license, where several marijuana plants were, in
fact, discovered.'"'
The court pointed out that other cases upholding the search of phones
incident to arrest were predicated on arrests for drug offenses, where
one might expect evidence of trafficking.8 1 In contrast, the defendant in
Quintana was arrested for driving with a suspended license, an offense for
which there could be no evidence in the phone." The court in Quintana
predicted that the Supreme Court would provide guidance in Gant, which
was undecided at the time. The Quintana court concluded that the search
of the phone furthered neither the goal of officer safety nor preservation
of evidence, and thus, was not justified by the search incident to arrest
exception.'
The standard the Court applied in Gant for the search incident to arrest
seems to be the best approach in serving people's Fourth Amendment
privacy interests and the needs of law enforcement in adapting to a
more mobile and connected society, of which criminals are members. As
illustrated by Quintana, the standard would operate somewhat differently
in the cell phone context than Gant did in the vehicle context.'8 A search
of a cell phone will almost never reveal a weapon that could be used to
harm police officers. The only danger to officers posed by a cell phone is
the ability of an arrestee to call for assistance from confederates. 87 This is a
highly improbable danger, as the officers will be able to observe and thwart
179 Id. at 1295-96.
18o Id. at 1296.
I8I Id.
182 Id. at 1299.
183 Id. at 1295. The Supreme Court has utilized similar logic, holding that the preserva-
tion of evidence exigency is no longer applicable if, by the nature of the suspected offense,
further evidence cannot possibly be discovered. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998)
("Once [the defendant] was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence nec-
essary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed
was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment
of the car.").
184 See Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1300.
185 Id. at 13oo.
I86 Id.
187 The argument has been made that the danger posed by a cell phone is very limited.
The possibility of an arrestee using the phone to strike an officer is still a possibility. Bryan
Andrew Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrandess Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV.
1165, 1196 (20o8). Of course, even if an officer does not seize the phone to avoid this threat,
the possibility of being struck with an object is a risk posed by all physical objects.
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any such attempt. This danger can also be avoided by simply seizing the
phone.1'
Also, as discussed earlier, some cell phone memory is not so limited
as to present a realistic possibility that incoming information will delete
incriminating evidence on the phone." There is, however, the realistic
possibility that an arrestee would attempt to delete incriminating
information on his or her cell phone. Seizing the phone can readily prevent
this.'"
Therefore, according to the standard announced in Gant, in the context
of the search incident to arrest exception, officer safety and preservation
of evidence concerns can be totally assuaged by seizure of the phone
upon arrest. But just as there are "circumstances unique to the vehicle
context,"'91 there may be circumstances unique to the cell phone context.
If officers have reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is in the
cell phone, then a search is not unreasonable.192 As the Quintana court
mentioned, drug trafficking cases may present a situation in which a cell
phone search incident to arrest is justified.' 93 For example, when a pager is
used to set up a controlled substances transaction, searching the cell phone
or pager might even be beneficial in supplementing the probable cause as
to whom the police should arrest.
CONCLUSION
As society changes, the law must adapt to the needs created by those
changes. Our legal values and our commitment to the principles embodied
in the Constitution, however, need only to be applied so as to provide
substantive protection to individual rights through objective standards.
Technological advances will continue to present challenges to the law.
I88 Id.
189 See supra Part IVB.
190 At least one writer for law enforcement has noted particular concern with service
providers and deletion: "Of particular concern with respect to the preservation of evidence is
the ability that service providers offer to some customers enabling them to remotely destroy
data on their cell phones." Clark, supra note 5, at 29.
191 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
192 See State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 170, 2009-Ohio-6426, 92o N.E.2d 949,956 at
' 27 ("While there may be some instances in which a warrantless search of a cell phone is nec-
essary to identify a suspect, we do not address this argument here, because the officers in this
case did not, in fact, rely upon the call records and phone numbers to identify the suspect.").
193 United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) ("Where a
defendant is arrested for drug-related activity, police may be justified in searching the con-
tents of a cell phone for evidence related to the crime of arrest, even if the presence of such
evidence is improbable. In this case, however, Defendant was arrested for driving with a sus-
pended license. The search of the contents of Defendant's cell phone had nothing to do with
officer safety or the preservation of evidence related to the crime of arrest.").
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Inherent in these advances is the reality that both socially beneficial and
socially undesirable uses will result. Rules providing for both the protection
of individual rights, especially those of constitutional dimension, and the
need for effective law enforcement will best serve the interests of society
and its constituent members. A Gant-like standard for cell phone searches
incident to arrest considers both interests.
